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The Jandrt decision reflects, in part, 
some of the ????????????of our existing 
sanction rules, as those rules are set forth 
in sections 802.05 and 814.025. As 
demonstrated in this article, the adoption 
of the current standards under Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP) could ameliorate manv of the 
adverse consequences of ??????without 
diminishing the manifest necessity of 
regulating and discouraging frivolous 
litigation. 
The Majority Decision 
In Jandrt, upon certification from the 
Wisconsin ?????of Appeals, a majority of 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed 
the trial court's decision that the Milwau-
kee law firm of Previant, Goldberg, 
Uelmen, Gratz, Miller & Brueggeman 
(Previant) had commenced a frivolous 
action against Jerome Foods.~ However, 
the supreme court's majority upheld the 
trial court's determination that Previant's 
continued prosecution of that action 
became frivolous. 5 While it remanded the 
action to the trial court for a recalculation 
of the sanction amount that should be 
imposed against Previant, the court's 
majority did not directly criticize the trial 
court's imposition of a $716,081 sanction 
against Previant.6 The sanction repre-
sented a ???????of the fees and costs 
incurred by Jerome Foods Inc. (JFI) in 
defending the Previant action. 
??????involved an alleged toxic tort. 
Previant commenced an action against 
JFI alleging that several children had 
been born with birth defects due to the 
???????of certain chemicals into the 
atmosphere of the JFI plant.~ The action 
was styled a class action and had two 
main claims: a claim for common law 
negligence and a claim for a violation of 
Wisconsin's Safe Place law under section 
101.11 (2) of the Wisconsin Statutes.8 
Both the majority and dissent in Jandrt 
considered the chronology of events 
before and after the filing of the action 
to be significant. 
Relevant Chronology. The 
relevant chronology according to the 
majority's decision follows. 
l) In November 1994 Previant 
received a referral ???? a trusted 
referring attorney, who had made a 
preliminary investigation that had 
disclosed to him that between 12 and 15 
women had indicated problem pregnan-
cies while working at J FI. Referring 
counsel had done a medicalliterah1re 
search for evidence of a possible relatiou-
ship between carbon dioxide or ammonia 
???birth defects. The referring attorney 
also had ?statement from one of his 
clients stating that her doctor had ????
her that JFI was probably responsible for 
her child havinga birth defect.~ 
2) In February 1995 the mothers of 
the children with hirth defects first 
retained Previant. w 
3) In ????????1995 Previant had an 
associate and a law librarian conduct a 
medical literature search. Previant also 
consulted with a toxic tort consultant 
MD, who told Previant that "in order to 
obtain an expert opinion on causation it 
??????be necessary to commence an 
action and obtain?discovery."'' 
4) On March I, 1995, Senate Billll 
was passed by the Wisconsin Legislature, 
significantly altering the law on joint and 
several liability.'~ 
5) In April?1995 Previant was advised 
by numerous sources, including its 
malpractice carrier, that suit should be 
?????in order to protect the rights of 
clients such as the plaintiffs in ?????t.13 
6) On or about Mav 10, 1995, 
Pre?iant commenced suitsooner than it 
other?ise would have because of its 
concerns relative to Senate Bill11.1~ 
7) On May 17, ???? Senate Billl1 
became law. 1·~ 
?? In May and again on June 21, 
1995, Previant formally requested 
documents from JFI, which request JFI 
resisted on the grounds that it would onlv 
produce documents under an order of . 
confidentiality. 16 
The supreme court's decision to uphold a frivolous litigation sanction in 
Jandrt v. Jerome Foods Inc. will alter the nature of satellite litigation under 
sections 802.05 and 814.025 and may very well change the overall 
practice methods of all civil litigators in Wisconsin. The Advisory 
Committee Notes to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 refer to litigation 
over the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 as litigation that is 
?satellite" to the main litigation from which it was derived. 
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9) On July 8, 1995, JFl learned from 
its expert that there was no way in which 
the plaintiffs could prove a causal 
relationship between the chemicals at 
JFI and the birth defects. 17 JFI never-
theless retained one local and one 
national law firm, several experts on 
negligence and causation, a pnhlic 
relations firm, and aprivate investigation 
????????
10) On July 13, 1995, JFI answered 
the Previant complaint, without making 
any mention of its belief that causation 
?????not be proved. ln fact,JFI did not 
in any way affirmatively raise the 
possible frivolousness of the Previant
claim in its answer. 18 
ll) On Dec. 7, 199.5, aftere tensive
negotiations, an order of ???????????????
was ????????????
12) On Jan. 31, 1996 and ????1, . 
19?6, _Previant ??? ???an ???????????
to rev1ew more than 2??????docu? ????
produced by JFJ.21 
13) Previant consulted with ???
exp rts; one ????????e. ????????? ?????
with anout-of-stateexpert, who advi ???
Previan that cause could not be proved 
(none of the experts??? th documents 
prod ????by JFI). 22
14) On Feb. 28_. ?????Previartt 
vo ??????? ????????? ???????????and only 
????was ???on noti?e by JFI of its 
????????? to se ???????? ?????
sections 802.05 and ???????????
The majority's decision i div.ided 
roughly into two parts. The first part 
analyzeswhether ????????????????????
c;ommen? d an actionWld r???????
802.05. the ??????part analyzes 
whether Previant frivolously continued 
the action under ection 14.025. 
Was th action frlvolou ly 
commenced under se?tion 802.05? 
Th majority stated that it would tum to 
federal ??????interpreting Rule 11 in 
?????to d ???????whether the trial 
court bad correctly ?????????that the 
action ???been???????????com-
menced. 24??wever, th ????????relied 
upon fede??????????? from prior to a 
fundamental and ????????????amend-
ment to Rule 11. ????????1993 case. th 
majority stated that ???circuit ????? is to 
????????????page 52) 
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{jrom page 13) 
apply an objective standard of conduct 
for litigants and attorneys.?2? Citing 
federal decisions from 1983, 1987, and 
1989, the majority then stated that 
decisions under Rule 11 are not to be 
made using the wisdom ????????????????
The majority then states that the 
single allegation in the Previant com-
plaint upon which JFI based its claim 
that the action against it had been 
frivolously com me need was Paragraph 
28, which contained an allegation of 
cause "on infom1ation and belief."27 The 
majority focused on Previant's failure to 
deal with the issue of causation under its 
common law negligence claim, while 
dismissing Previan??s point made that the 
alternate claim for relief under 
Wisconsin's Safe Place law required no 
proof of causation.28 1t appears clear that 
negligence or safe place law constituted 
completely alternate causes of action in 
PAGE 52- WISCONSIN LAWYER -MAY 2000 
?????sense and either theory could have 
allowed for a recovery against JFI for the 
alleged harm done to the plaintiffs. 29 
Then citing federal authorities from 
1985, 1986, 1987, 1992, and 1993, the 
majority concluded that Previant had no 
right to rely upon what the referring 
attorney or the client said about the 
claim.30 
While it would be "good practice" to 
consult an expert before trial, the majority 
concluded that Previant did not have an 
obligation to retain an expert before 
commencing suit because of the pending 
change in the law of joint and several 
liability.31 Characterizing it a "close case," 
the majority finally did conclude that 
Previant had not frivolously commenced 
the lawsuit.32 
Was the action frivolously contin-
ued under section 814.025? When the 
supreme court concluded that the lawsuit 
was not frivolously commenced, its 
analysis under section 802.05 was at an 
end,???and thus one might conclude that 
any further comparisons to Rule 11 of the 
FRCP were similarly at an end. However, 
while the court stated that section 802.05 
was patterned after Federal Rule 11, 34 it 
nevertheless also observed that "in many 
respects, these are the same guidelines 
[under section 802.0.5] a circuit court uses 
in its determination of frivolousness 
under Wis. Stat.§ 814.025."35 
In the discussion of the court's 
analysis of whether the action was 
frivolously continued, one ought to bear 
in mind several important considerations. 
First, this action was pending only for a 
total of nine months.36 The court con-
cluded that the action became frivolous 
just 43 days after its commencement, 
without explaining the significance of that 
period.37 The majmity concluded, for 
several reasons, that the action was 
frivolously maintained. A review of those 
reasons seemsto show a reliance on the 
trial court's findings on the issue of a 
frivolously commenced law suit. Although 
the court concluded that the action was 
not frivolously commenced, it concluded 
that Previant should have completed a 
series of taskswithin the following 43 
days. According to the majority, Previant 
did not: 
I) Obtain an expert ???????who 
supported the cansation theory upon 
which rested the claims in the 
complaint.??
2) Consult vvith an identified 
scientific or medical professional with 
expertise in the areas of teratology, 
toxicology, epidemiology. genetics, 
pediatrics, or the causes of birth 
defects. 39
3) Interview any treating physician of 
any of the mothers or the children in 
????????40
4) Pursue the purported "cover up" 
identified as one of the bases for the 
filing of the complaint. 41
5) Conduct a co.mprebel1Sive review 
of the medical records of the mothers 
and children in question. 42 
6) Attempt to identify the risk factors 
present in the mothers of the three 
children with birth defects????
7) Conduct an evaluation through 
consultation with appropriate medical 
and scientific authorities of the multiple 
pregnancy problems among JFI 
employees. ??
The majority concluded that the 
Previant ????"unreasonably followed" 
the toxic tort consultant's recommenda-
tion to commence a lawsuit in order to 
take discove1y, since the Previant finn 
could have obtained all the information it 
required regarding chemical usage at JFI 
from OSHA records.l5 Despite Kelly v. 
Clark, 46 the majority found that Previant 
was not entitled to a "safe harbor" 
whereby Previant could safely file a 
pleachng and ma??reasonable inquiry 
through formal discove1y as to uncertain 
or unclear facts vvithin a reasonable time 
after the pleading was f?led.47 In the 
words of the majority, a '"safe harbor' is 
not a loophole through which attorneys 
may escape the requirement of Wis. Stat. 
§ 814.025 that an action have a reason-
able basis in law or ???????????????is unclear 
why the majority found that the action 
was not frivolously commenced, since 
the OSHA records presumably would 
have been available both before and after 
the commencement of the action. 
According to the majority, while a 
plaintiff need not "exhaust" outside 
sources of information before embarking 
on discovery, the Previant firm ??????to 
avail itself of ???????????that was 
available without discovmy, such as the 
OSHA reports."9 The majority said, 
"[ t]he Previant ????mav have believed 
thatJFl had more. detailed information 
on the levels of exposure than that which 
is required by OSHA. However, that 
belief does not excuse the Previant firm 
for failing to avail itself of information 
that was available without discov??y." 
And yet, again, all of these conclusions 
are in ?????contrast vvith the majority's 
conclusion that Previant did not frivo-
lously commence the lawsuit. 
Stating that a party is not relieved of 
its responsibility to ensure that an action 
is well-grounded in fact and law once an 
action is commenced, the ????????states 
"it is the facts the Previant firm knew 
and what it should have done in light of 
its recognition that the causal element 
was essential to its claim that lies at the 
heart of this appeal. "50 However, 
Previant did commence disc:ove1y 
immediately after the action 'vvas filed 
and was met by stiff resistance from JFI 
when it insisted on a protective order 
before it would turn over any documents 
for Previant's review.51 Despite the 
request for production of documents in 
June of 1995, and the consequent failure 
of JFI to produce same, the majority 
concluded that "for nine months the 
Previant firm did nothing to ???to 
establish ... causation."52 This begs the 
question of just what should Previant 
have done. 
Given the stringency of the 
majority's decision, it no longer will 
suffice to commence an action, counter-
claim, or cross-claim and then focus on 
one form of discove1y until that avenue is 
exhausted. If there are any doubts 
concerning the merits of a claim, 
immediate, aggressive, and comprehen-
sive discove1y \vill be the only prudent 
course of action. Fmther, if relevant 
information can be acquired, either 
before or after suit, by any means other 
than through formal discove1y, one 
would be very well advised to aggres-
sively pursue it. 
Another disturbing aspect of the 
majority's decision is its conclusion that 
SATELLITE LITIGATION 
the purpose of sanctions under section 
814.025 is not just punitive. "[W]e are less 
convinced that compensation is not an 
appropriate consideration [under 
81 4.025] ... [I]n a proper case, [814.025 
may] provide full compensation for 
reasonable attorney fees necess??y to 
defend ???????a frivolous action ... We 
embrace this view today."53 The emphasis 
on sanctions as a form of compensation 
may lead to a proliferation of ??????under 
sections 802.05 and 814.025. Alter all, if 
one believes that there is a colorable basis 
for seeking sanctions, the failure to assert 
such a claim may be malpractice. 
The Wisdom of Federal Rule 11, 
as Amended in 1993 
The majority analyzes the decision of the 
Previant firm to commence litigation bv 
reference to federal decisions interpreting
Hule ll of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. However, almost all of the 
decisions relied upon by the majority pre-
date 1993. According to one commen-
tator: 
"Because many of the elements of 
Rule 11 were changed in 1993, be careful 
about relying on earlier cases. Such 
rulings were made when sanctions were 
mandatmy .and when fee-shifting was the 
most commonly imposed sanction . 
Neither is true under the amended 
?ule."51 
When analyzing the majority's 
decision, it is important to contrast 
sections 802.05 and 814.025 and the 
majority's decision wi.tb the language of 
F?CP 11 and the AdvisOJy Committee 
Notes that appertain to its 1993 amend-
ment. First, current FRCP 11 is not 
mandatmy. Moreover, arguably, the 
???????????????11 would today reach 
conduct covered by both section 802.05 
and?814.025. F?CP ll (b) now provides 
in pertinent part: 
"By presenting to the court (whether 
by signing, filing, submitting, or later 
advocating) a pleading, written motion, or 
other paper, an attorney or unrepresented 
party is ??????????that to the best of the 
person's knowledge, information, and 
belief, formed after an inqui1y reasonable 
under the circumstances, 
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"(I) it is not being presented for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation; 
"(2) the claims, defenses, and other 
legal contentions therein are warranted 
by existing law or by a nonf1ivolous 
argument for the extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law or the establish-
ment of new law; 
"(3) the allegations and otherfactual 
contentions have evidentiary support or, 
if specifically so idmtifled, are likely tv 
har:e evidentiary support after a reason-
able opp???????????further in?estigation 
or ?????????? and 
"( 4) the denials of factual contentions 
are warranted on the evidence or, if 
specifically so identified, are reasonably 
based on a lack of information or belief." 
[Emphasis supplied.] 
FRCP 11 further provides that a 
motion under same "shall be served as 
provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed 
withor presented to the court unless, 
within21 days after se1vice of the 
motion (or such other period as the 
comt may prescribe), the challengell 
paper, claim, defense, contention, 
allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or 
appropriately corrected.·· 
According to the Advisory Commit-
tee Notes ?????????FRCP 11, the 1993 
Amendments were intended to: 
1) Equalize the burden of the rule 
on plaintiffs and defendants. 
2) Establish uniform standards ???
the imposition of sanctions, which could 
be monetary or nonmonetary. ?????
standards: 
"[E]numerate the factors a ?????
should consider in deciding whether to 
impose a sanction or what sanctions 
would be approp1iate in the circum-
stances .... [that is ]'Whether the 
improper conduct was ?ilful, or 
negligent; whether it was part of a 
pattem of activity, or an isolated event; 
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whether it infected the entire pleading, or 
only one particular count or defense; 
whether the person has engaged in 
similar conduct in other litigation; 
whether it was intended to injure; what 
effect it had on the litigation process in 
time or expense: ... what amount, given 
the financ·ial resources of the responsible 
person, is needed to deter that person 
f'rom repetition in the same case; what 
amount is needed to deter similar acti???y 
by other ??????????
3) The court has significant discretion 
in determining what sanctions, if any. 
should be imposed for a \iolation. subject 
to the p?inciple that the sanctions should 
not be more severe than reasonably 
necessary to deter repetition of the
conduct by the offending person or 
comparable conduct by similarly situated 
persons. 
?)?Since the purpose of Rule 11 
sanctions is to deter rather ???? to 
compensate, the rule providesthat if a 
monetary sanction is imposed, it 
ordinarily should be paid into court as a 
penal?y. 
5) Any award of fees to ???????party 
under F?CP 11 should not exceed the 
expenses and attorney fees for the 
services directly and unavoidably caused 
by the of Hule 11. 
6) If a wholly unsupportable count 
were included in a multi-count complaint 
or counterclaim any award of expenses 
should be limited to those directly 
caused by inclusion of the improper 
count, and not those resulting from the 
filing of the complaint or answer itself. 
The award should not provide compen-
sation forservices that could have been 
avoided by an earlier disclosure of 
evidence or an earlier challenge to the 
groundless claims or defenses. 
lt1s Time to Conform Wisconsin's 
Sanction Rules to Federal Rule 11 
?????? is not just a problem for tbe 
plaintiffs' bar. In fact, the Civil Trial 
Counsel sought to intervene in Jandrt 
when Previant's .Motion to Reconsider 
was pending before the supreme court. 
Serious consideration should be given to 
reforming our frivolous sanctions law to 
better conform to the landscape of 
F?CP] l practice in the following 
respects. 55 
Levy sanctions on those who 
bring groundless motions for 
sanctions. As Justice Bradley put it in 
her dissent, a party cannot spend 
unlimited resources to defend a frivolous 
action without those expenditures 
????????frivolous as well. 
Adopt the FRCP 11 provision 
that pennits courts to ???sponte 
impose sanctions on offending 
parties. Why should sanctions be the 
exclusiveprovince of a satellite 
adversarial proceeding? Perhaps it is 
clearthat one party is frivolous, but the 
otherparty in seeking redress may cross 
intofrivolousconduct as well. Why 
shouldn't the court have the power to 
stepin and sanction both offenders? 
A partywho believes that a claim 
is frivolous shouJd not be able to 
withhold that information from the 
comt and opposing counsel until 
after the expenditme of considerable 
sums of money and judicial re-
sources. Shouldn't a party with such 
knowledge at the minimum be required 
to plead affirmatively the existence of a 
frivolous claim (which wasn't done in 
Jandrt) or at least not be permitted to 
benefit from a considerable delay in 
asserting same? 
More carefully calibrate sections 
802.05 and 814.025 so as to take 
account of the factors mandated 
under FRCP 11, especially those 
factors that focus more precisely on 
the equity of a sanctions inquiry. That 
is: whether the improper conduct was 
willful, or negligent; whether it was part 
of a pattern of activity, or an isolated 
event; whether it infected the entire 
pleading, or only one particular count or 
defense; whether the person has engaged 
in similar conduct in other litigation; 
whether it was intended to injure; what 
effect it had on the litigation process in 
time or expense; what amount, given the 
responsible person's financial resources, is 
needed to deter that person from 
repetition in the same case; and what 
amount is needed to deter similar activity 
by other litigants. 
Conclusion 
To litigate is to sail in troubled waters. All 
members of the trial bar, however, have 
an interest in ensuring that reason able 
safe harbors exist both for their own 
protection and to secure equal justice for 
all members of our societv. It is time to at 
least reexamine our frivolous sanction 
rules in light of the 1993 amendments to 
FRCP 11. 
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her dissent, a party cannot spend 
unlimited resources to defend a fli,ulous 
action \\ithout those ex1wnditures 
becoming flivolous as well. 
Adopt the FRCP 11 prmision 
that permits courts to sua sponte 
impose sanctions on offending 
parties. Why should sanctions be the 
exclusive proviuce of a satellite 
adversarial proceeding? Perhaps it is 
dear that one party is frivolous, but the 
other party in seeking redress may cross 
into frivolous conduct as well. Why 
shouldn't the court have the pow~r to 
step in and sanction both offenders? 
A party who believes that a claim 
is frivolous should not be able to 
withhold that infonnation from the 
court and opposing counsel until 
after the expenditure of considerable 
sums of money and judicial re-
sources. Shouldn't a party with such 
knowledge at the minimum be required 
to plead affirmatively the existence of a 
frivolous claim (which wasn't done in 
Jandrt) or at least not be permitted to 
benefit from a considerable delay in 
asserting same? . 
More carefully calibrate sections 
802.05 and 814.025 so as to take 
accow1t of the factors mandated 
under FRCP 11, especially those 
factors that focus more precisely on 
the equity of a sanctions inquiry. That 
is: whether the improper conduct was 
,.,.il\ful, or negligent; whether it was part 
of a pattem of activity, or an isolated 
event; whether it infected the entire 
pleading, or only one particular count or 
defense; whether the person has engaged 
in similar conduct in other litigation; 
whether it was intended to injure; what 
effect it had on the litigation process in 
time or expense; what amount, given the 
responsible person's financial resources, is 
needed to deter that person fi·om 
repetition in the same case; and what 
amount is needed to deter similar activity 
by other litigants. 
Conclusion 
To litigate is to sail in troubled waters. All 
members of the t1ial bar, however, have 
an interest in ensuring that reasonable 
safe harbors t~xist both for their 0\\11 
protection <Uld to secure PljLJal justice for 
all members of our society. It is time to at 
least reexamine our frivol~us sanction 
mles in light of the 1993 amendments to 
FRCPll. 
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